Cross-Cultural Interactions
Discussion
Concisely stated, the central question of the study has been: Are negotiation processes and outcomes the same in cross-cultural interactions as in intra-cultural interactions? The study has considered six important negotiation constructs and tested for variation using four distinct cultural groups. Changes in behavior and outcomes have been observed in seven out of the twenty-four possible instances. The overall conclusion of the study therefore must be that negotiators do indeed adapt their behaviors in cross-cultural interactions.
Negotiatiors in each of the four cultural groups made changes. Changes were also made in each of the six variables processes and outcomes. American negotiators were more satisfied in cross-cultural interactions. The Japanese were more attracted to American negotiators than their fellow Japanese, even though their profits were reduced when bargaining with Americans. Francophone Canadians behaved much more cooperatively with Anglophone Canadians. The Anglophone Canadians spent more time and achieved lower joint profits in crosscultural interactions.
Consistent with Graham and Herberger's comments, the American negotiators appear to be the most obstinate. Their behavior remained consistent across situations, only their post hoc expressions of satisfaction changed from one circumstance to the next. Rubin and Brown's low interpersonal orientation (IO) label seems to fit the Americans in our study, suggesting they did not heed their negotiation partner's behavior and made few adjustments to their own.
The lack of American adaptation also is consistent with acculturation theory the Japanese should tend to make more adjustments due to their history of dependence on the American economy. Indeed, the Japanese-American negotiations were conducted entirely in English.
While it is true that the data were collected in Los Angeles and none of the Americans spoke Japanese, neither factor mitigates the basic finding that the Japanese tend to adapt more. Indeed, Americans' general weaknesses in foreign language reflects a societal level problem which manifests itself at the individual level in our study. Although not specifically focused upon in this research, all the conversations between Francophones and Anglophones were conducted in English (i.e., as viewed on the subset that were videotaped), even though data were collected in Montreal and many of the Anglophones were bilingual. However, the results (as reported in Table 3.3) show that both Canadian groups adapted in other ways. Obviously, these issues raised by acculturation theory deserve further attention, especially as global economic relationships continue to shift.
The literature in cross-cultural communication and Evan's similarity hypothesis indicate that cross-cultural negotiations will be more difficult than intra-cultural negotiations, that both processes and outcomes would be affected in a negative way. These views, summarized in Hypothesis la, are supported in four of the seven change situations discovered. The profits (both individual and joint) were reduced for Japanese in cross-cultural negotiations. Cross-cultural negotiations took longer for the Anglophone Canadians, and their joint profits were lower when working with the Francophones.
The literature on reciprocity and interactional synchrony suggests that negotiators will imitate or reflect one another's behaviors, and thereby adapt to differing cultural situations. In two cases, such views (i.e., Hypothesis lb) are supported. The Americans raised their level of satisfaction to that of the Japanese in the cross-cultural interactions. And the Francophones increased their cooperativeness (PSA) to the level of their Anglophone counterparts in the cross-cultural negotiations.
The only finding that cannot be explained by established theory is that Japanese negotiators were more attracted to Americans than they were to their fellow Japanese. We can think of two possible post hoc explanations. First, perhaps the Americans were rated more attractive because of a novelty factor. The questions used in the attractiveness measure (see Appendix 3C) include the terms "interest" and "comfort". And, if the novelty factor was important, then the Japanese might rate the Americans higher on the "interest" items and lower on the "comfort" items. However, an examination of the means of the individual items fails to support such a conclusion.
The second explanation regards differences in behaviors and attitudes between Japanese buyers versus Japanese sellers. Graham et al. describe an unusual hierarchical relationship between Japanese buyers and sellers, contrasted with a more egalitarian relationship between American buyers and sellers. Thus, one might guess that Japanese sellers facing American buyers (and the latter's more egalitarian approach) might express higher levels of interpersonal attraction. And this appears to be the case Japanese sellers rated American buyers more attractive (X = 13.7) than Japanese buyers rated American sellers (X = 12.4), and the difference was statistically significant (p < .05).
This latter finding, indeed all the results, indicate that much more work needs to be done in this area. All we have been able to do in this initial study is scratch the surface of an increasingly important phenomenon. We now have some indication that negotiators do change their behavior in cross-cultural negotiations. And we therefore must be quite careful when we interpret and suggest implications of comparative studies. Moreover, some of the theories we have interpersonal orientation, similarity, communication problems, reciprocity, interactional synchrony, and acculturation theory seem to be applicable. But the phenomena also appears to be more complex than our simple approach warrants.
Limitations of the study
It is important to be aware of the limitations and shortcomings of the research design. There are several such issues involved in this laboratory simulation.
Perhaps the most important consideration is the validity of the principal outcome measure, individual profits. Kelley's negotiation simulation and similar measures have been used in other studies, but how well the simulation represents actual business negotiations remains problematic. Any laboratory experiment is open to criticism regarding external validity this research is no exception.
Additionally, much of the evidence supplied for accepting or rejecting hypotheses derives from participants' self-reports and judgments. In particular, the reliability and validity of the process measures depend entirely upon the participants' immediate post-negotiation memory and impressions of the actual negotiation. Future studies should include improvements in both these areas.
Finally, the most profound limitations of this and similar studies may be the theories and methods themselves developed by American behavioral scientists. Perhaps the American behavioral consistency across intraand inter-cultural negotiation situations reflects a similar obstinacy in American theory building, or an artifact of the simulation and measures used. Graham and Gronhaug discuss such issues at length. Hofstede and Bond provide further evidence supporting this final caveat in their comparisons of Chinese and several Western cultures' managerial styles. The latter report that three of the four primary dimensions that explain variations in Western managerial behavior (power distance, individualism-collectivism, masculinity-femininity) are salient to the Chinese while one Western dimension (uncertainty avoidance) is irrelevant and one Eastern dimension (Confucian dynamism) must be added. This "Eastern dimension," Confucian dynamism, was invisible to researchers using Western paradigms: it only emerged when theory and measures were derived from empirical studies of the Chinese. The help of foreign researchers and the use of more inductive methods in foreign cultures will be needed to mitigate such limitations in future studies.