Cross-Cultural Interactions

Negotiation theory

Theory suggests that outcomes of business negotiations will be influenced by three classes of constructs bargainer characteristics, situational constraints, and process-related measures. The first two constructs are exogenous and are determined before negotiations begin. Process-related measures are endogenous constructs which may be influenced by bargainer characteristics and situational constraints, and which in turn may influence the outcomes of negotiations. The present study investigates the influence of a situational constraint (intracultural versus cross-cultural negotiations) on the processes (strategies, interpersonal attraction, and duration), and outcomes (satisfaction and profits) of business negotiations. 

Negotiation process constructs

Problem-solving approach

The problem-solving approach (hereafter PSA) to negotiations involves first an emphasis on questions and getting information from clients about their needs and preferences. Second, once the client's requirements and circumstances are fully understood, then the negotiator accommodates the offering to the client's needs. The focus is on cooperation and an integrative approach, wherein the needs of both parties are honestly discussed and eventually satisfied. For a discussion of the place of honesty in negotiations, see Murray. A PSA then can be concisely defined as a set of negotiation behaviors which are cooperative, integrative, and information-exchange oriented. Such strategies tend to maximize the number of alternative solutions considered, thus allowing negotiators to optimize outcomes. 

The relationship between a problem-solving approach and negotiation outcomes has been frequently investigated during the last twenty years. Different researchers have used various labels for the PSA concept, but findings have been relatively consistent. Generally, PSA has been found to positively influence negotiation outcomes. 

Interpersonal attraction

In addition to the bargaining strategy itself, interpersonal attraction (e.g., like/dislike, friendly/unfriendly feelings) can strongly influence current negotiation outcomes and the success of future transactions. Rubin and Brown, in their review of the negotiation literature, conclude that interpersonal attraction generally enhances bargaining outcomes. McGuire explains that when people are attracted to each other they will make sacrifices (i.e., concessions in a negotiation) to preserve the gratifying personal relationship. Thus, an individual bargainer may give up economic rewards for the social rewards of a relationship with an attractive partner. To the extent that one receives rewards from a relationship with an attractive partner, the person will be more satisfied with the relationship (or in this case, with the negotiated agreement).

It should be noted that interpersonal attraction might be conceived as an exogenous construct determined before negotiations begin, as a part of the combination of the negotiators' characteristics. It may also be argued that attraction is a consequence of the negotiation, an outcome construct. However, in this study, attractiveness is considered a process-related construct. This is consistent with the views of Evans and Zunin and Zunin. Evans suggests that similarity of negotiators leads to more favorable negotiation outcomes. Zunin and Zunin suggest that during the first few minutes of conversation "decisions" are made about interpersonal attractiveness and whether to continue the interaction. 

Time

In the cross-cultural negotiation literature, duration of the negotiations is described as a key aspect of the process. For example, Tung and Van Zandt report that negotiations with Chinese and Japanese are exasperatingly long from the perspective of most American managers. Pruitt discusses at great length the pervasive influence of time on negotiations. That is, time limits affect the qualities of the aspirations, concession making, and negotiation satisfaction. Although time limits per se are not varied in this study, negotiators from different cultures may have different expectations about "appropriate" durations, which may in turn influence behaviors. 

Time can also be thought of as an outcome construct. Indeed, Green et al. considered duration of negotiations as such. This takes into account the economic value of a negotiator's time. However, Hall has suggested that such a "time is money" view is peculiarly American.

Negotiation outcomes

Profits and satisfaction

Researchers often find outcomes of business negotiations difficult to measure and to compare. Various studies have used sale versus no sale, an obvious measure of bargaining effectiveness, profits obtained by bargainers, and a combination of individual and joint profits. Beyond profits, negotiator satisfaction is an important measure of success, especially if partners desire a continued relationship. Given the dual importance of task accomplishment (profit) and relationship building (satisfaction), especially in international negotiations, the present study uses both as outcomes.